Barry Friedman\u27s The Will of the People: Probing the Dynamics and Uncertainties of American Constitutionalism by Purcell, Edward A., Jr.
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Articles & Chapters
1-1-2010
Barry Friedman's The Will of the People: Probing
the Dynamics and Uncertainties of American
Constitutionalism
Edward A. Purcell Jr.
New York Law School, edward.purcell@nyls.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
2010 Mich. St. L. Rev.
BARRY FRIEDMAN’S THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: 
PROBING THE DYNAMICS AND UNCERTAINTIES 
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Edward A. Purcell, Jr.* 
2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 663 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. COMMITMENTS .................................................................................... 664 
II. FRIEDMAN’S “LESSONS” OF HISTORY ................................................. 666 
A. The Court and Popular Opinion ................................................... 666 
B. Fundamental Questions ............................................................... 672 
III. SOME HISTORICAL PARTICULARS ....................................................... 679 
A. The Origins and Significance of the Judiciary Act of 1875 ........ 680 
B. The Ugly Head of “Formalism” Reared Again ........................... 682 
C. Race, Corporations, and the Turn-of-the-Century Turns ............. 687 
D. History and Theory ...................................................................... 693 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 694 
 
Coming from a professor of constitutional law, The Will of the People1 
is somewhat unusual, some might even say “radical.”2  “Great” cases ab-
ound, but they are treated as “great” not because they are monuments to 
constitutional principles but because they were targets of public outcry.  The 
book’s focus, moreover, is not on the Supreme Court, individual justices, or 
inter-curial negotiations, nor is it on jurisprudential theories, methods of 
interpretation, or the meaning of particular constitutional provisions.  Legal 
arguments and technical analyses are, in fact, almost wholly absent.   Per-
haps most surprising, the book advances no normative theory of either con-
stitutional law or Supreme Court decision-making.  Instead, it attempts 
something quite different.  Drawing thoughtfully on the methods and in-
sights of history and political science, it probes the American past seeking 
  
 * The author is the Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor at New York Law 
School.  He wishes to thank Doni Gewirtzman for helpful comments and suggestions. 
 1. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 2. Given the strict creedal and ritualistic requirements currently mandated for Se-
nate confirmation, for example, no nominee for a federal judgeship would likely dare admit 
agreement with many of its claims.  
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an honest understanding of the evolving de facto relationship between pub-
lic opinion and the Supreme Court’s distinctive practice of judicial review. 
I.  COMMITMENTS 
On first reading, The Will of the People brings to mind Charles War-
ren’s classic study, The Supreme Court in United States History.3  Like 
Warren, Friedman focuses on the political and social context in which the 
Court works and the critical interaction between the justices and the views 
and values of the American people.4  Unlike Warren, however, Friedman 
heralds the latter, not the former, as the ultimate constitutional authority and 
the key to the proper operation of the nation’s constitutional system. 
Writing in the 1920s, the politically conservative Warren, whom 
Friedman aptly terms an “apologist for the Supreme Court,”5 sought to pro-
tect the Court from Progressive critics who challenged its position and 
urged legislative restrictions on its power.  The Court, Warren believed, was 
the essential foundation of American constitutionalism and the guarantor of 
its principles and values. 
That the Court is not infallible, that like all other human institutions it makes its 
mistakes may be acknowledged; yet in spite of the few instances in which it has 
run counter to the deliberate and better judgment of the community, the American 
people will unquestionably conclude that final judgment as to their constitutional 
rights is safer in the hands of the Judiciary than in those of the Legislature, and that 
if either body is to possess uncontrolled omnipotence, it should be reposed in the 
Court rather than in Congress, and in independent Judges rather than in Judges de-
pendent on election by the people in passionate party campaigns and on partisan 
political issues.6 
Friedman, in contrast, is the people’s champion, a scholar who joins 
the contemporary liberal effort to open constitutional law more widely to 
the influence of popular attitudes by challenging the view that the Court is 
the final authority on the Constitution’s meaning.7  The Court, he believes, 
  
 3. CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1922) (a 
study in three volumes).  
 4. “Some prominent works of political science and history have taken into account 
the relationship between the popular will and judicial power, but they fail to capture how that 
relationship has evolved throughout the course of American history.”  FRIEDMAN, supra note 
1, at 11. 
 5. Id. at 181. 
 6. 3 WARREN, supra note 3, at 476-77. 
 7. E.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 248 (2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court is our servant 
and not our master: a servant whose seriousness and knowledge deserves much deference, 
but who is ultimately supposed to yield to our judgments about what the Constitution means 
and not the reverse.  The Supreme Court is not the highest authority in the land on constitu-
tional law.  We are.”).  For similar works by other contemporary liberal scholars, see, for 
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is a melding institution that has come to mediate between the Constitution 
and the pressures of inexorable social change by adapting the law to the 
evolving values and interests of the American people.8 
Ultimately, Thayer’s and Hand’s instinct is correct: we have nothing but ourselves 
to fall back upon.  But it is wrong to claim, as many have, that the judges have sto-
len the Constitution from us.  Judicial review is our invention; we created it and 
have chosen to retain it.  Judicial review has served as a means of forcing us to 
think about, and interpret, our Constitution ourselves.  In the final analysis, when it 
comes to the Constitution, we are the highest court in the land.9 
Thus, unlike his scholarly predecessor, Friedman looks not to a wise 
and near perfect judicial guardian but to the people themselves.  “Ultimate-
ly, it is the people (and the people alone) who must decide what the Consti-
tution means.”10  He looks to the people, moreover, not because he attributes 
to them unusual intelligence, wisdom, or virtue.  Rather, he looks to them 
because their authority is both normatively proper as a matter of democratic 
principles and, more telling, practically unavoidable as a matter of the his-
torical record.  From theoretical questions about whether the Court is, or 
should be, the supreme and final authority on the Constitution’s meaning, 
Friedman moves to more practical and experiential questions about the ex-
tent to which popular opinion and values—regardless of normative theo-
ries—have in fact shaped the Court’s evolving constitutional jurisprudence. 
It is toward answering such historical questions that Friedman devotes 
his book.  “What history shows,” he declares, “is assuredly not that Su-
preme Court decisions always are in line with popular opinion, but rather 
that they come into line with one another over time.”11  Rather than enforc-
ing an unchanging Constitution or serving as a sacerdotal check on popular 
passions, the Court unevenly tracks and ultimately accommodates the 
people’s shifting values and attitudes.  The Supreme Court’s greatest suc-
cesses have come when it confirmed or successfully anticipated significant 
  
example, SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE 
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993); RICHARD D. PARKER, “HERE THE PEOPLE RULE”: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION 
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).  For discussions of such liberal commentary, see, for ex-
ample, James E. Fleming, The Constitution Outside the Courts, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 215 
(2000) (book review); Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, 
and the True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897 (2005); L. A. Powe, Jr., Are 
“the People” Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855 (2005) 
(reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)).  Although Friedman says little about his own politics, his basic 
liberal sympathies seem clear.  E.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, 8-9, 14, 234.  For his criticism 
of some liberal theorists, see id. at 302-03. 
 8. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 14-16. 
 9. Id. at 384-85. 
 10. Id. at 367. 
 11. Id. at 382. 
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and long-term shifts in public opinion.  Its greatest failures have come when 
it tried to stand against strong and persistent public opposition.12  When it 
confronted such opposition, success came only if and when it avoided is-
sues, backtracked on its decisions, or simply reversed itself. 
Warren’s view may be more conventional and comforting.  Fried-
man’s is more acute and challenging. 
II.  FRIEDMAN’S “LESSONS” OF HISTORY 
A.  The Court and Popular Opinion 
The Will of the People examines American constitutional history from 
a realistic perspective.  It considers constitutional doctrine as a set of rea-
sonable interpretations and adaptive rules that have been developed, re-
molded, and sometimes discarded over the years in response to changing 
conditions, problems, and values.  “[W]hat the Constitution is understood to 
encompass,” Friedman emphasizes, “has changed over time in ways that are 
dramatic, sweeping, and often permanent.”13  The dread “counter-
majoritarian difficulty,” the book shows, represents but one contingent cha-
racteristic of the American constitutional system, a characteristic that has 
had a fluctuating significance over the course of the nation’s history as well 
as one whose actual “difficulty” has been both misunderstood and over-
blown.14  Inevitably, the book highlights the inadequacy of modern “origi-
nalism.”  While many other scholars have shown why originalism cannot 
work as a generally applicable method of constitutional interpretation,15 
  
 12. E.g., id. at 136 (“Still, the Supreme Court was constantly in jeopardy during [the 
Civil War and Reconstruction], apparently because the justices were unable to read the pub-
lic mood or unwilling to temper their actions in the face of it. . . . From Dred Scott through 
the end of Reconstruction, Congress exercised control over the Court when the justices 
proved unable to understand what they could and could not safely accomplish.  The Supreme 
Court’s conduct, and congressional supervision of it, brought the derision of the country 
upon the justices.”). 
 13. Id. at 367. 
 14. Friedman’s prodigious and superb scholarship on constitutional law and history 
includes an elaborate five-part study of the history of the countermajoritarian difficulty.  See 
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to 
Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Barry Friedman, The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction’s Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1 
(2002); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The 
Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001); Barry Friedman, The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971 (2000); 
Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajorita-
rian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).  
 15. Perhaps the most recent and compelling examples of the failure of originalism as 
a determinative method of constitutional interpretation occurred in the Court’s decisions in 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 
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Friedman shows that it is also false to the history of American constitutional 
interpretation.16  In spite of their frequent, if varied, claims about adhering to 
an “original” meaning of the Constitution, the Court and the American 
people have interpreted it in changing ways over the years to reflect altered 
historical conditions and shifting popular attitudes.  Thus, originalism is not 
only incapable of prescribing the proper interpretation of the Constitution in 
the future, but it is also inaccurate in describing how it has actually been 
interpreted in the past.17 
In discussing such constitutional “methodologies,” Friedman offers an 
important insight: “Ideas take hold and flower when they make sense of the 
world in which they are planted,” he explains.18  “Just as discussion of the 
living Constitution flowed logically from the pens of liberals in the 1970s, 
originalism fitted conservative intuitions about the Constitution in the 
1980s.”19  The power of any interpretative theory, he suggests, comes from 
its consistency with, and utility for, the goals and values embedded in a 
broader ideological perspective.  As an interpretative theory comes to fit 
and serve the needs of that perspective, it gradually becomes for its adhe-
rents a matter of fundamental theoretical truth as opposed to remaining a 
mere consciously-used partisan tool. 
Friedman identifies four “critical periods” in the changing relationship 
between the Court and popular opinion.20  The weight of public opinion, he 
argues, shifted from bitter rejection of an overtly partisan national judiciary 
during the Federalist Era, to frequent defiance of federal judicial power dur-
ing the first third of the nineteenth century, to persistent efforts to control 
the uses of that power in the long period from the Civil War to the New 
Deal, and finally to a broad contemporary acceptance of an authoritative 
judicial power that has learned sagely to accommodate dominant currents of 
public opinion.21  While “[t]he nature and extent of the Supreme Court’s 
  
S. Ct. 3020 (2010); see, e.g., Jeffrey M. Shaman, The End of Originalism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 83 (2010). 
 16. For a history of the continuous use of originalist appeals in American history, 
see JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY (2005). 
 17. For a further exploration of the inadequacies of “originalism” emphasizing the 
role that statutes play in changing constitutional assumptions and meanings over time, see 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010).  Regularly, “the Constitution accommodates superstatutory 
initiatives” by honoring the new values they establish and then entrench, and “the Constitu-
tion’s arguable original meaning did not stand in the way.” Id. at 23. 
 18. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 313.  His view echoes that of William James.  See, 
e.g., William James, The Will to Believe, in AMERICAN THOUGHT: CIVIL WAR TO WORLD 
WAR I  147-49 (Perry Miller ed., 1959).    
 19. Id. 
 20. See, e.g., id. at 12-16. 
 21. See id. for the author’s brief description of the four periods. 
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authority have plainly grown over time,”22 the Court has acquired “this 
power only because, over time, the American people have decided to cede it 
to the justices.”23  They have done so because in recent times the Court’s 
“decisions hew rather closely to the mainstream of popular judgment about 
the meaning of the Constitution.”24  Friedman thus traces a national learning 
curve and draws from it a Whiggish conclusion that contains, for the mo-
ment at least, a great deal of truth. 
More interesting, he also suggests that the more difficult questions 
about the Court’s decision-making involve when, why, and to what extent 
his conclusion about deference to popular opinion does not hold.  He readily 
acknowledges that “there is some slack between what the governed want 
and what the governors provide”25 and that “a variety of factors” protect the 
independence of the justices “and allow them to deviate from popular opi-
nion.”26  Thus, the crucial point in his argument is not merely the broad 
claim that the Court follows public opinion but the complicating qualifica-
tion that a range of exceptions and limitations exist.27 
Friedman identifies one of the most important factors creating “slack” 
between popular opinion and the Court’s decisions as “low public sa-
lience,”28 a factor whose significance he may well substantially understate.  
One can readily think of many decisions and lines of cases—such as those 
involving standing, preemption, the dormant Commerce Clause, the Seventh 
and Eleventh Amendments, due process limits on personal jurisdiction, 
congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
President’s power to make sole executive agreements—that are of major 
practical importance but that have hardly caused a ripple in popular opinion.  
Beyond the relatively small number of truly towering issues in the nation’s 
constitutional history, in truth, the great bulk of the Court’s constitutional 
decisions have likely had—at most—only an indirect and squinting relation-
ship to public opinion. 
Indeed, it seems likely that truly “popular opinion” hardly exists on 
many constitutional issues and that, to the extent it does exist, it is largely 
the processed product of elite debates, media propagation, interest group 
activism, and political party agitation.29  Friedman acknowledges that such 
  
 22. Id. at 9. 
 23. Id. at 14. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 375. 
 26. Id. at 377. 
 27. See, e.g., id. 
 28. Id.  “The Roberts Court,” he points out as an example, “has decided a large 
number of ‘pro-business’ cases” that the media and public have largely ignored. Id. at 377-
78. 
 29. As a general matter, Friedman would seem to agree with this. 
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“elite” factors substantially dilute the impact of popular opinion.30  Some-
times “the justices listen to elite voices, rather than that of the average per-
son,”31 and some constitutional provisions—such as the First Amendment—
command their “own special constituency” which is able to exert particular-
ly effective pressure on the Court and the political system.32  Thus, the 
quality of “low public salience” may be far more significant, and the slack 
the Court enjoys from truly “popular” opinion far broader, than The Will of 
the People seems to indicate. 
Equally important, Friedman notes that the Court’s decisions have a 
“sticky” quality, meaning “that they are difficult to change or get around.”33  
This stickiness, he continues, has “a certain virtue” in that “it plays an es-
sential role in separating out the considered ‘constitutional’ views of the 
American people from passing fancy.”34  Granting that virtue, such stick-
iness nonetheless also means that many decisions may remain law even 
though they fall outside the “mainstream of popular judgment” and, further, 
that a kind of path dependency may sustain many decisions and their evolv-
ing lines of progeny with little or no regard for popular opinion. 
As a final factor limiting the impact of public opinion, Friedman ac-
knowledges “the sheer difficulty of enacting a law to punish the justices” or 
reverse their decisions.35  Such retaliatory laws are not only difficult to 
enact, but they are also difficult to formulate with enough precision to ac-
tually achieve whatever results the Court’s critics desire.  The legal tools 
available to chastise the judiciary are, after all, notoriously cumbersome and 
unreliable.  Moreover, it is often nearly impossible to get critics to agree on 
a specific retaliatory proposal that all can rally behind.  When explaining 
why Progressives failed to control the Court as so many of them hoped to 
do, for example, Friedman stresses the fact that they simply “could not 
agree” on a specific reform that all or even most could support.36  
Thus, Friedman’s general claim about the impact of popular opinion is 
not as broad as it might initially appear.  Indeed, his final explanation for 
the “slack” in the system edges toward tautology.  “Ultimately, though, the 
best explanation for the justices’ independence may simply be that the pub-
lic decides to grant it to them.”37  A deep reservoir of “diffuse”—that is gen-
eral and institutional—public support allows the Court to assert its indepen-
dence in a wide range of areas, even if it is always subject to possible inter-
  
 30. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 378. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 383. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 377. 
 36. Id. at 185. 
 37. Id. at 379. 
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ventions by a deeply aroused public.38  When and how such interventions 
take place and when and how they succeed, however, remains unclear.  
“[W]e do not know nearly enough about popular preferences in this regard,” 
he acknowledges.39  Indeed, the very concept of “public opinion” is itself so 
complex and amorphous that it is often impossible to chart its true nature, 
let alone its relationship to the Court’s decisions.40  This overarching diffi-
culty poses an unavoidable challenge to any effort to specify the limits of 
the book’s thesis.  
While the precise way that public opinion influences the Court may be 
unclear, Friedman suggests several transmittal mechanisms.  One is that the 
justices are “only human” and consequently share the general values and 
attitudes of the public.41  He might have added, further, that they also gener-
ally share the more specific values and attitudes of some particular elements 
of that public.  Another mechanism is the apparent willingness of some jus-
tices “to play to immediate public opinion.”42  It “does not require many 
justices on the Court at any time to be sensitive to public opinion,”43 he 
notes, and a shift of only one or two in response to popular outcries may be 
sufficient to stop or reverse a line of decisions.44   
More important, returning to his central thesis, Friedman insists that 
the justices simply “do not have much of a choice” about heeding public 
opinion if they wish to preserve the Court’s institutional authority, ensure 
that its decisions will be enforced, and avoid “being disciplined by poli-
tics.”45  The justices, by and large, are practical men and women who have 
increasingly learned to pay heed to the public and to the limits of their pow-
er.  Friedman gives great weight to what he sees as the justices’ continuing 
concern with the threat of political retaliation.46  Thus, although he ac-
knowledges the great difficulty critics face in attempting to “discipline” the 
  
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. at 380.  
 40. Earlier, Friedman had written that scholars:  
do not know enough about how the public gets its information about constitutional 
decisions, about public support for the institution of judicial review, about the ex-
tent to which the Justices are aware of or influenced by public opinion, and about 
the conditions under which political actors will heed judicial decisions with which 
they disagree. 
Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional 
Scholarship, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 951 (2001). 
 41. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 374. 
 42. Id. at 374-75. 
 43. Id. at 375. 
 44. Id. at 250, 254-58 (suggesting Justices Frankfurter and Harlan changed positions 
on civil liberties issues in the late 1950s in response to public criticism of the Court’s mid-
decade decisions). 
 45. Id. at 375. 
 46. See id. 
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Court, he nonetheless insists that the people’s disciplinary tools impose a 
vital and meaningful limitation on the justices’ sense of freedom and inde-
pendence.  “If the preceding history shows anything,” he writes, “it is that 
when judicial decisions wander far from what the public will tolerate, bad 
things happen to the Court and the justices.”47 
Friedman’s emphasis on the relatively direct influence of public opi-
nion and the real possibilities of political retaliation—or at least the justices’ 
genuine concern about such pressures—is meant, among other things, to 
qualify theories of “regime” politics.  Many historians and political scien-
tists have argued that the primary and regular mechanism through which 
public opinion affects the Court is the political process of elections, presi-
dential appointments, and Senate confirmations.  When the voters choose 
one party over another, especially when they do so with some consistency 
over a series of elections, that party will be able to fill the bench with its 
ideological adherents, and the federal courts will consequently reshape the 
law to reflect the basic policies and values of that party.48  When the popular 
majority shifts to another party, subsequent elections may establish a new 
political “regime” which will, in turn, eventually re-staff the federal courts 
and remold the law once again. 
For Friedman, such theories are inadequate.  “The appointments 
process, standing alone,” he declares, “cannot guarantee responsiveness to 
public opinion.”49  Even when presidents carefully select justices who re-
flect their own views, for example, “ideological drift” may move them in 
unexpected and unwanted directions.50  Instead, he maintains, public opi-
nion itself often plays a direct role in determining the Court’s course. “Polit-
ical scientists in particular tend to focus on the institutions of government, 
rather than the people at large,” he explains.51  “But the United States is a 
democracy, and the will of the people still prevails, at least on the big is-
sues.”52  He is likely right, but the contention only returns us to one of the 
central questions the book raises:  Which issues, after all, are the truly “big” 
ones? 
  
 47. Id. 
 48. On “regime” theories, see, for example, Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a 
Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); Lee 
Epstein, Jack Knight, & Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme Court as a Strategic National 
Policymaker, 50 EMORY L. J. 583 (2001); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (2007).  For a general review of the literature, see Thomas M. 
Keck, Party Politics or Judicial Independence?  The Regime Politics Literature Hits the Law 
Schools, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 511 (2007).  
 49. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 374. 
 50. See id. 
 51. Id. at 375. 
 52. Id.  
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B.  Fundamental Questions 
Whatever the relative importance of public opinion as opposed to re-
gime politics, The Will of the People has the great virtue of placing at center 
stage some truly fundamental questions about American constitutionalism: 
How has our system functioned—notwithstanding its imperfections, abuses, 
and failures—to maintain our ideals and practices of limited government, 
public accountability, individual rights, and popular democracy?  What is 
the true nature of our constitutional “rule of law,”53 and how is it to be prop-
erly understood given an honest recognition of both our de facto national 
experience and the realities that mark the operation of our legal and political 
systems?54 
In approaching those fundamental questions, Friedman offers some 
well-considered conclusions and underscores one haunting worry.  Perhaps 
his most provocative conclusion is that by the late twentieth century Ameri-
cans have succeeded in hammering out a “dialogic system of determining 
constitutional meaning,” a system that “works” with a kind of rough but 
reliable “magic.”55  The Constitution itself is based on an “intractable ten-
sion” between the ideals of democracy and government under law, and after 
long and sometimes tumultuous experience the Supreme Court’s power of 
judicial review “has become the American way of mitigating the tension 
  
 53. “The rule of law” is a frequently misused concept, for many different kinds of 
“rules of law” are possible.  Holding aside the varieties that exist in other nations and cul-
tures, for example, in the United States the kinds of “rules of law” we live under vary from 
those that are relatively clear, simple, and specific (laws, for example, that involve automo-
bile and highway usage) to those that are more complex, elaborate, and flexible (laws, for 
example, that involve corporate securities regulation) to, finally, the law of the United States 
Constitution itself which is inherently incomplete, evolving, and value-based.  The fact that 
constitutional law differs in many ways from automobile law, securities law, and any number 
of other areas of law does not negate its character as providing a “rule of law.”  Rather, it 
exemplifies the fact that there is no single form of “the rule of law,” although its many varie-
ties share a common-and-essential-element: established institutions, mechanisms, and norms 
regularly used in reasonable and orderly ways to subject human behavior to sets of generally 
known and fairly applied rules and standards.  The specification of that essential element 
varies, of course, with the subject matter addressed.  As Aristotle noted, “it is a mark of the 
trained mind never to expect more precision in the treatment of any subject than the nature of 
that subject permits.”  ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 65 
(J. A. K. Thomson trans., Penguin Books rev. ed. 1976). 
 54. Although Friedman’s book has a great deal in common with the work of Bruce 
Ackerman, he does not attempt to shape his arguments into a general normative theory of 
constitutional change or constitutional legitimacy.  Compare BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE 1: FOUNDATIONS (1991), and BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2: 
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS], with FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 1. 
 55. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 382.  The “dialogic” process is an idea Friedman has 
been mulling for many years.  See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 577, 580-81 (1993). 
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between government by the people, and government under a Constitution.”56  
“[T]he most important lesson that history teaches” is that the critical ele-
ment of judicial review “is not the Supreme Court’s role in the process, but 
how the public reacts to [its] decisions.”57  
Almost everything consequential about judicial review occurs after the judges rule, 
not when they do.  Judges do not decide finally on the meaning of the Constitution.  
Rather, it is through the dialogic process of “judicial decision—popular response—
judicial re-decision” that the Constitution takes on the meaning it has.58 
The inherent tension between the Court and the people varies over 
time and occasionally heightens to the point of crisis, but through a variety 
of working transmission mechanisms the Court soon adapts and the views 
of the people prevail.59  Thus, he concludes, “through a dialogue with the 
justices, the Constitution comes to reflect the considered judgment of the 
American people regarding their most fundamental values.”60 
The Court’s alleged “switch in time” in 1937 seems the most famous 
example of the process Friedman outlines.61  “[T]he obsessive focus on 
whether the justices switched—i.e., whether they changed their position on 
crucial constitutional questions because of the threat to the Court [from 
F.D.R.’s Court-packing plan]—is a bit misplaced.”62  While Friedman be-
  
 56. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 367. 
 57. Id. at 381.  Thus, while Friedman discounts the significance of the counter-
majoritarian difficulty, his argument is nonetheless compatible with Alexander Bickel’s view 
of the Court’s practical influence: 
The Supreme Court’s judgments may be put forth as universally prescriptive; but 
they actually become so only when they gain widespread assent.  They bind of 
their own force no one but the parties to a litigation.  To realize the promise that all 
others similarly situated will be similarly bound, the Court’s judgments need the 
assent and the cooperation first of the political institutions, and ultimately of the 
people. 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 90 (1970). 
 58. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 381-82. 
 59. Friedman may give insufficient attention to what seems a key part of the 
process, the ways in which the Court’s decisions sometimes alter the nature of popular de-
bate and bring shifts in the political coalitions involved in contesting the relevant issue or 
issues.  Thus, while public opinion can influence the Court, the Court can also help reshape 
public opinion.  See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, The Framing of a Right to Choose: Roe v. Wade and 
the Changing Debate on Abortion Law, 27 LAW & HIST. REV. 281, 284 (2009). 
 60. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 367-68. 
 61. He identifies other “switches” as well.  E.g., id. at 145 (describing Justice Brad-
ley’s “unmistakable change of heart” on Reconstruction). Id. at 250, 254-58 (explaining that 
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan changed positions on civil liberties cases in the late 1950s), 
287 (discussing how the “Court quickly moved into line with public opinion” in its death 
penalty decisions after the popular reaction against Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972)).  Along similar lines, Friedman also notes instances when the Court ducked issues to 
avoid confrontations with popular opinion. Id. at 121 (during the Civil War the “Court did its 
best to stay out of harm’s way”).  
 62. Id. at 229. 
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lieves that the evidence strongly points to such a switch by Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes and Justice Owen J. Roberts, he insists that the cen-
tral question is not one of judicial doctrine and consistency but one of public 
perception and insistence.63  How much pressure was the public willing to 
place on the Court, and how did the public react to its 1937 decisions that 
suddenly validated much of the New Deal?  “In assessing the Court’s vulne-
rability to public pressure, what matters is not so much whether the justices 
consciously changed the direction of constitutional law under pressure as 
whether the public believed they had.”64  And, Friedman states, in 1937 the 
public clearly believed that the Court had changed its views, and it fully 
supported that change.65  “All told, contemporary evidence suggests power-
fully that had the Court not switched, the public would have supported dis-
ciplining it.”66  
This is a critical contention.  It is a key part of Friedman’s answer to 
those who would deny that public opinion guides the Court, and it is his 
particular answer to those who do deny that F.D.R.’s threat to pack the 
Court caused the justices to “switch” their views.  Such switch-denying 
scholars offer a variety of arguments to support their dismissal of the presi-
dent’s threat.67  They maintain that no individual justice in fact altered his 
doctrinal position, and hence, that there was no “switch” in the first place; 
they argue that substantial constitutional change was already underway prior 
to the threat and hence that the apparent change in 1937 was merely a nor-
mal phase in an ongoing doctrinal evolution that had nothing to do with the 
Court-packing plan; and they argue that both the public and Congress 
swung emphatically against the Court-packing plan over the first half of 
1937 and, hence, that the President’s threat was hollow and could not have 
  
 63. As Friedman notes, a “switch” might well require only one or two justices to 
alter their views.  See id. at 375. 
 64. Id. at 231.  
 65. See id. at 233. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Works of prominent scholars who deny that the Court packing plan influenced 
the Court include BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF 
A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
NEW DEAL (2000); and Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experi-
ments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891 
(1994).  For the more traditional view arguing that some of the justices did “switch” and 
attributing the change to political pressure, see, for example, JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER 
CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938); EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 
(1941); BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1942); and 
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995).  On the current state of the debate, see, for 
example, Alan Brinkley, AHR Forum: The Debate Over the Constitutional Revolution of 
1937, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1046 (2005). 
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pressured the justices because the plan could not have been enacted.68  
Friedman’s thesis essentially avoids the significance of all of those conten-
tions.  It makes the various doctrinal arguments irrelevant on the ground that 
the public had little understanding of them and, in any event, cared little or 
nothing about them.  Further, it makes the growing opposition to the plan 
the result of the widespread belief in Congress and among the public that 
the Court had in fact “switched” and that, consequently, the President’s plan 
was no longer necessary.69  The technical merits of the doctrinal debates 
were unrelated to the dynamics of the actual “dialogic process” that was 
underway, and the shifts in popular and congressional opinion simply 
represented the successful conclusion of the dialogue.  Whatever it was the 
justices did as a doctrinal matter, the public perceived the results as both 
substantial and in accord with its demands.   
While undoubtedly capturing a great deal of truth, that analysis does 
not seem entirely satisfactory.  If the Court did not, in fact, actually 
“switch” in some significant way in the first half of 1937, it is not clear why 
Friedman’s claim about the public’s willingness to discipline the Court 
would matter or what his claim about its “impact” on the Court would 
mean.  Could it be that the public had somehow been distracted, mistaken, 
or misled?  Conversely, if the Court did “switch,” but did so only later, as 
some argue, then a “regime” theory emphasizing the role of Roosevelt’s 
new judicial appointees would seem to explain the course of events.   
A more complete explanation for what happened in the spring of 1937 
might begin by modifying two elements that figure in the traditional debate:  
first, deemphasizing the alleged impact of the Court-packing plan itself and, 
second, conceiving the “switch” as something more subtle than a willful 
embrace of that which had previously been rejected.  The first modification 
would highlight the full and complex range of social pressures that played 
on the Court at the time,70 and the second would recognize the elastic and 
incomplete quality of constitutional doctrine and the complex and often 
subtle human factors that guide judicial reasoning.  Such an approach would 
suggest, then, that Hughes (possibly) and Roberts (likely) gave some weight 
  
 68. See generally sources discussed supra note 67. 
 69. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 232-34. 
 70. For example, Hughes and Roberts were surely aware that many conservatives 
and Republicans reacted strongly against the Court’s “conservative” decision in Morehead v. 
New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), which voided a state minimum wage law for 
women.  “Even normally conservative newspapers termed the ruling ‘regrettable,’ and the 
Republican presidential candidate, Alfred M. Landon, carefully distanced himself from the 
Court’s conservative bloc.  The Republican Party platform that year specifically approved of 
state regulation of wages and hours for women and children.”  MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. 
BRANDEIS: A LIFE 684-85 (2009).  Tipaldo was one of the decisions that the Court abandoned 
in its “switch” in the spring of 1937.  See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 
(1937). 
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to those social pressures—including their estimates of “public opinion” and 
the possibility that some kind of disciplinary action might be taken—and 
gently shaded their doctrinal principles and applied them in a somewhat 
different manner than they would have done at an earlier point in time.71  
Thus, public opinion would have played a role in pressuring a doctrinal 
shift, but the process would be seen as a somewhat nuanced and finely-
grained shift rather than as an abrupt and fully self-conscious about-face.    
Beyond his argument about the “switch” itself, Friedman draws two 
other general conclusions from the Court-packing episode.  First, he dec-
lares that “[t]he true significance of 1937” was that “[t]he American people 
signaled their acceptance of judicial review as the proper way to alter the 
meaning of the Constitution, but only so long as the justices’ decisions re-
mained within the mainstream of popular understanding.”72  The New Deal 
justices “wrote a new Constitution,” and unlike F.D.R.’s effort to change the 
law by “packing the Court, this method of constitutional change was widely 
hailed as the proper one.”73  
His recourse to the “mainstream” metaphor at this point seems both 
apt and revealing, for that image has come to serve as the dominant norma-
tive criterion in the political rhetoric of the modern judicial confirmation 
process.  Those who support a judicial nominee must insist that their candi-
date is well within the “mainstream” of American values, while those who 
oppose must—if they hope to prevail in the absence of a determined and 
substantial opposition bloc in the Senate—show that the candidate is clear-
ly, and even outrageously, outside that “mainstream.”  The metaphor is thus 
apt because it informs the controlling rhetoric of the judicial confirmation 
process, and it is revealing because its widespread use suggests the extent to 
which those on both sides have come to accept the political premise—
usually acknowledged in public only with great care and greater art—that 
judges should, in fact, tailor their constitutional views to accord with popu-
lar opinion. 
Second, Friedman concludes that a mutual understanding grew out of 
the Court-packing experience and over the subsequent years came to inform 
  
 71. Cf. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Rethinking Constitutional Change, 80 VA. L. REV. 
277, 280 (1994) (suggesting that the Court’s doctrines allowed the justices to support a varie-
ty of decisions in the cases they decided in the 1930s and that “[t]o show that a doctrinal 
passageway existed is important, but it is not to show why the individual Justices—
particularly Justice Roberts in a five-to-four decision—chose to walk through it”).  Contra 
Barry Cushman, Lost Fidelities, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 95 (1999) (arguing that Hughes 
and Roberts remained doctrinally consistent and that those who believed they “switched” did 
not understand the nature of their constitutional jurisprudence). 
 72. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 196. 
 73. Id.  Friedman’s conclusion is similar to Ackerman’s theory that judicial review 
is a potentially legitimate non-Article V method of amending the Constitution.  See 
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 54, at 279-382. 
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both the people and the Court.74  The former no longer made serious at-
tempts to assert control over the Court, and the latter remained closely tied 
to the public’s dominant attitudes.  “[I]t has taken the Court and the public 
some time to learn how their relationship might work,” he explains; “now 
that it is understood, violent upheaval is no longer necessary.”75  Recogni-
tion of the process has generated a new systemic stability.  “Now that the 
justices and the public understand how things work, the system tends to rest 
in a relatively quiet equilibrium.”76 
The haunting worry that Friedman identifies follows directly from 
those central conclusions and, of course, from the corollary that the coun-
termajoritarian difficulty is no serious difficulty at all.  “But if we can at 
long last move past the question of whether the justices are influenced by 
popular opinion, a question whose only conceivable answer is yes,” he dec-
lares, “we can at least start to tackle the really meaningful question of when 
and how the justices are free to stand up to the popular will in the name of 
the Constitution.”77  From the nation’s beginning, the Supreme Court was 
hailed as the institution that would protect the minority from the majority,78 
a function that gave rise to what might be called the countermajoritarian 
boast.  Whether seen as a “difficulty” or a “boast,” however, the belief that 
the Court would play a countermajoritarian role has proven largely unwar-
ranted.  The assumption that judges will “stand up against the majority,” 
Friedman warns, is “deeply problematic.”79  In fact, he suggests, the as-
sumption is highly dubious if not largely false.  “If any worry seems legiti-
mate, it is that the” Court will not hold out against the majority and will, 
instead, “kowtow to public opinion and pay insufficient heed to the tradi-
tional role of judicial review in protecting minority rights.”80 
That last sentence seems puzzling.  If Friedman is right that the coun-
termajoritarian difficulty has been badly overblown and that the Court tends 
to follow public opinion, how can he also maintain that the role of “protect-
ing minority rights” has truly been the “traditional role of judicial review.”  
Perhaps he means either a “theoretically idealized” role of protecting minor-
ity rights or the “sometimes actually realized” role of protecting some mi-
  
 74. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 376. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 374. 
 78. See THE FEDERALIST, NO. 78 508 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 79. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 370.  “It is difficult to understand Korematsu [Ko-
rematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)], the most prominent of the internment cases, 
as anything but stark capitulation to the decisions made by military and political authorities.”  
Id. at 372. 
 80. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 372.  “What we ought to care deeply about, what we 
ought to be asking, is how much capacity the justices have to act independently of the pub-
lic’s views, how likely they are to do so, and in what situations.”  Id. at 373. 
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nority rights.  Or, perhaps, his sentence simply illustrates our recurrent ef-
forts to create from selected bits and pieces of the past grand normative 
“traditions” that we believe useful for present purposes.   
To his compelling concern about the need to protect minority rights, 
Friedman offers both a hope and a challenge.  The hope is explicit.  “But 
perhaps the central function of judicial review today is to serve as the cata-
lyst for the people to take their Constitution seriously, to develop their con-
stitutional sensibilities, in the hope that they will adhere to those sensibili-
ties when the chips are down.”81  The challenge is more implicit.  It is ulti-
mately up to us, the American people, to see that individual and minority 
rights are protected and that the society remains one of order, freedom, jus-
tice, tolerance, and equality.  There are no other guarantees, and neither 
clinging to constitutional myths nor relying on judicial guardians can ulti-
mately secure and preserve those ends.  
Beyond those incisive analyses and provocative conclusions, The Will 
of the People provokes some even more deeply puzzling questions: How 
and to what extent does the Constitution bind the American people together, 
and how and in what ways does it help us mediate our disputes and resolve 
them relatively peaceably and effectively?  Would the Constitution, in fact, 
bind us together more effectively and beneficently if we assumed that it had 
an “original” meaning that could be objectively ascertained and that our 
most basic disputes could be resolved by determining that true meaning in 
novel and changing circumstances?  And, if we adopted such an assump-
tion, would its principal value lie in the extent to which it distracted us from 
real and intense conflicts that could bring us to blows while diverting our 
energies relatively harmlessly into passionate—if necessarily misguided and 
unending—searches for the true and predetermined solutions to those dis-
putes?  Or, conversely, would the Constitution bind us together more effec-
tively and beneficently if we assumed that it authorized and required chang-
ing applications and that our most basic disputes could best be resolved by 
adapting its provisions fairly and pragmatically to meet the nation’s chang-
ing needs and values?82  And, if we adopted that latter assumption, would it 
actually help us focus more effectively on the pressing issues that confront 
us, or would it make our real and practical conflicts even more raw, bound-
  
 81. Id. at 384.  The contemporary debate over building an Islamic mosque two 
blocks from the site of the World Trade Center seems an obvious test case for Friedman’s 
hope. 
 82. Stephen Skowronek identifies the pragmatic “living Constitution” approach, an 
approach that Friedman seems to share, with twentieth-century progressivism.  “The progres-
sives wanted to strip discussions of power of their constitutional pretenses so as to force the 
defenders of established arrangements to engage in a pragmatic, open-ended, and explicitly 
political debate over what the largest interest, ‘the public interest,’ demanded.”  Stephen 
Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental Pers-
pective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2086 (2009). 
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less, and ultimately irreconcilable?  Which, in other words, is of greater 
long-term social and political value: a national faith that the Founders 
created a talismanic and eternally-specified Constitution or a hard-eyed un-
derstanding that unavoidable political battles determine the meaning of a 
wise and noble, if partially malleable and evolving, Constitution?83 
While few may wish to hazard confident answers to those questions, 
there are promising middle-ground possibilities, and Friedman suggests the 
outline of one such response.  Even accepting the fact that its meaning 
changes in rough accord with public opinion, the Constitution nonetheless 
proclaims our most fundamental values, underwrites an open and tolerant 
political culture, and establishes a cumbersome but shrewd political struc-
ture that creates innumerable opportunities for public opinion to influence 
and even determine governmental outputs while at the same time creating 
equally innumerable obstacles and filters that shape, channel, and delay the 
impact of that public opinion.  Friedman’s “dialogic process” between the 
Court and the people, then, would appear as one more manifestation of the 
salutary principle of separation of powers that lies at the heart of our consti-
tutional system, a principle that helps generate the system’s power to in-
duce—generally, if not invariably, for the better—relatively slow, consi-
dered, stabilizing, and significantly consensus-based change.84  Perhaps this 
means that the American people have, through the institutions of their Con-
stitution and their long resulting experience in ordered self-government, 
been transformed into their own trustworthy guardians.  For that reason, 
they are capable of accepting a hard-eyed understanding of their constitu-
tional system while still maintaining an abiding faith in its institutional vir-
tues and political values. 
Such, at least, would be the theory.  
III.  SOME HISTORICAL PARTICULARS   
The richness of The Will of the People and the shortness of space ne-
cessitate a highly truncated discussion of historical particulars.  Three inter-
related issues involving the Court’s history in the late nineteenth and early 
  
 83. Caught up in immediate controversy, Americans can . . . fail to see that 
what looks to be a roaring battle over judicial power is simply the latest round in 
a much broader struggle over the proper interpretation of the Constitution. . . . It 
is the meaning of the Constitution itself that is up for grabs, and judicial power is 
nothing more than a pawn in that battle. 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 9. 
 84. “The system works not because the justices are solons with a special capacity for 
distinguishing between [mere passing popular attitudes and the fundamental and well-
considered views of the public] but because separation occurs through the regular process of 
decision, response, and redecision, as it plays out over time.”  Id. at 384. 
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twentieth centuries merit special comment.  Each in its own way supports 
Friedman’s general thesis even if it qualifies parts of his historical analysis. 
A.  The Origins and Significance of the Judiciary Act of 1875 
Friedman follows those who have pointed to the pro-business motives 
that underlay passage of the Judiciary and Removal Act of 1875, which 
granted general “federal question” jurisdiction to the national courts.85  
While congressional Republicans did support the act to “increas[e] corpo-
rate access to the federal courts,”86 Friedman’s emphasis on that purpose 
tends to obscure profound political and economic shifts that occurred in the 
decades after 1875.  In the immediate post-Civil War years, Northern com-
mercial and financial interests surely pressed Congress for advantageous 
legislation, and, as a general matter, they also preferred litigating in federal 
as opposed to state courts.  The availability of federal forums, however, was 
not nearly as pressing a political issue for them in 1875 as it would become 
during the subsequent quarter century.   
For corporate interests in the 1870s, the new federal question jurisdic-
tion offered few particularly noteworthy advantages,87 while long-
established diversity jurisdiction remained their most commonly used and 
vigorously defended route into the national courts.  Federal constitutional 
law generally gave wide berth to state laws regulating business88 and only 
two years before the 1875 Act was passed The Slaughter-House Cases89 had 
disappointed business interests and essentially negated the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause as a national limitation on state regulatory powers.  In 
the 1870s, moreover, the Court was highly suspicious of the new national 
corporations, dubious about their growing size and power, and often sympa-
  
 85. See id. at 163 (citing, inter alia, FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE 
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 64-65 (1927); 
Cf. Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: 
Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 517 (2002) 
(arguing that the 1875 Act was intended to bring commercial matters into the federal courts 
but emphasizing that it was political and institutional changes during the following fifteen 
years that transformed the federal courts into havens for “national commercial interests,” at 
517).  Although an undisputed classic, the Frankfurter and Landis book must be read cau-
tiously.  See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections 
on Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 681-706 (1999). 
 86. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 163.  For his discussion of the period, see id. at 150-
66. 
 87. One of the few advantages of federal question jurisdiction would have involved 
an expanded opportunity to challenge state anti-drummer legislation in federal court.  See, 
e.g., id. at 150-53; Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the 
Large Corporation, 1875-1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 636 (1978). 
 88. E.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 
 89. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
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thetic to the aggrieved individuals who sued them.90  Substantive due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment was still but a glimmer in the 
minds of a few corporate attorneys.91  Further, common-law claims, even 
those falling within the so-called “general” or “federal” common law, raised 
formally “state” law issues that could not confer jurisdiction as “federal 
questions.”92  When such claims came to the national courts, they did so 
through diversity jurisdiction, not through federal question jurisdiction.  
Equally important, by the 1870s, the Court and the lower federal judiciary 
had demonstrated that diversity jurisdiction was more than adequate to ena-
ble them to check the efforts of the mid-western towns and counties that 
sought to repudiate their bonds.93  Finally, the massive influx of tort and 
contract actions against national corporations that would soon swamp the 
courts had not yet begun, and the bitter battles over federal jurisdiction be-
tween corporations on one side and state regulators and an emerging plain-
tiff’s personal injury bar on the other still lay in the future.94 
Thus, emphasis on the pro-business origins of the 1875 Act risks ob-
scuring the fact that the 1880s and 1890s were decades of drastic change in 
both the politics of federal jurisdiction and the social orientation of the Su-
preme Court.95  The events of those later decades transformed the general 
and long-established preference of interstate businesses for the national 
courts into a near-frenzied conviction that such access was essential to pre-
serve economic investment and avoid a widespread and class-driven spolia-
tion of corporate wealth.96  More to the point, those changes also helped 
  
 90. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY 
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 64-86 (1992); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 66, 78-
79, 92 (1992). 
 91. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN 
MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 251 (2003).  The Court did 
not determine that corporations were “persons” within the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause for another decade in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 
(1886), and what is regarded as the first substantive due process case, Chicago, Milwaukee & 
St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890), did not follow until four years after 
Santa Clara.  
 92. See Delmas v. Ins. Co., 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 661, 665-66 (1871); N.Y. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 287 (1876); United States v. Thompson, 93 U.S. 586, 588-89 
(1875). 
 93. “Preoccupation with the protection of bondholders caused a majority of the 
Justices to be insensitive to all other considerations in these complex situations.  What is 
more, slovenly work concealed egregious deviations even from professed principles.”  
CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, PART I 1101 (1971). 
 94. PURCELL, supra note 90, at 19-22. 
 95. See id. at 28-103. 
 96. By the 1890s, for example, Supreme Court Justice David J. Brewer warned 
against coercion by the democratic masses and the threat of governmental “spoliation and 
destruction of private property,” while federal circuit court judge William Howard Taft told 
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transform the Court from a relatively balanced and cautious overseer of a 
nationalizing economy into a bold protector of both the national market and 
the national corporate interests that controlled it.  Indeed, into the 1880s the 
Court generally sought to keep the jurisdiction of the national courts narrow 
and to limit the reach of federal law, and it was only in the 1890s that it 
began methodically and broadly to expand both.97  Thus, the Judiciary Act 
of 1875 proved a critical element in that later transformation, but only as it 
was subsequently deployed by an ideologically transformed Court and ex-
ploited by newly aggressive corporate interests in a distinctly different so-
cial and political context. 
B.  The Ugly Head of “Formalism” Reared Again 
Although Friedman mentions the term only in passing, he continues 
the well-established practice of characterizing the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century as a period of judicial “formalism.”  “At the turn of the 
twentieth century,” he writes, “many judges and some prominent academics 
took a ‘formalist’ approach to legal interpretation, in which answers to legal 
questions could be derived as a doctrinal matter purely from the cases them-
selves.”98   
Friedman does not, of course, seem to believe that the Court was 
“formalistic” in the sense of actually deciding cases solely by reasoning 
“logically” from principles and precedents.  In identifying the Court’s “shift 
in perspective” to a centralizing and pro-corporate orientation, for example, 
he contrasts its decision in Munn v. Illinois99 with its decision a decade later 
in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v. Illinois.100  In the former, the 
Court found no Commerce Clause problem and upheld a state’s power to 
  
the American Bar Association that corporations “all carry their litigation into the Federal 
courts” whenever possible because “of the deep-seated prejudice entertained against them by 
the local population” in the states of the south and west.  David J. Brewer, Justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, Protection to Private Property from Public Attack, Address Before the Gra-
duating Classes at the Sixty-Seventh Anniversary of Yale Law School (June 23, 1891), in 19 
NEW ENGLANDER & YALE REV. 97, 107-08 (1891); William H. Taft, Judge of the U.S. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, Criticisms of the Federal Judiciary, Address Before the American Bar 
Association (Aug. 28, 1895), in 29 AM. L. REV. 641, 651 (1895).  During the decade both 
Brewer and Taft worked purposely and assiduously to strengthen the legal position of corpo-
rations and to expand their ability to use the federal courts.  PURCELL, supra note 90, at 79-
81, 109-12. 
 97. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ex parte Young and the Transformation of the Fed-
eral Courts, 1890-1917, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 931, 934-35 (2009). 
 98. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 192.  In an endnote, Friedman does suggest skeptic-
ism about the nature of such judicial “formalism.”  See id. at 477 n.225 (citing BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 
(2009)). 
 99. 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 
 100. 118 U.S. 557 (1886). 
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regulate rates charged by grain elevators “even though in so doing it may 
indirectly operate upon commerce outside its immediate jurisdiction.”101  In 
the later case, the Court found that a state’s effort to regulate railroad rates 
on intrastate trips did violate the Commerce Clause.102  Although the state 
law “purports only to control the carrier when engaged within the State,” 
Wabash reasoned, quoting the Court’s decade-old decision in Hall v. De-
Cuir,103 “it must necessarily influence his conduct to some extent in the 
management of his business throughout his entire [interstate] voyage.”104  
Consequently, the Court held that the state law intruded into interstate 
commerce and transgressed the Commerce Clause.  After Wabash the jus-
tices “were in the business of reviewing railroad rates,” Friedman declares, 
and they subsequently “went on a binge of striking down state laws to pro-
tect corporate interests and property rights.”105 
Any number of other decisions would confirm Friedman’s point that 
the Court was not following any “formalistic” method of reasoning but, 
rather, was seeking quite pragmatically to enforce its views of desirable 
public policy.  The case Wabash quoted and relied on, for example, was part 
  
 101. Munn, 94 U.S. at 135. 
 102. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co., 118 U.S. at 576-77.  
 103. 95 U.S. 485, 489 (1877).  
 104. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co., 118 U.S. at 571-72 (quoting Hall, 95 U.S. at 
489), quoted in FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 462 n.203. 
 105. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, 160-61.  The exact number of statutes the Court struck 
down is disputed, as is the practical significance of its efforts.  Friedman cites several studies 
showing that the Court allowed most regulatory laws to pass scrutiny, see id. at 472 n.138, 
and notes that Charles Warren produced a study arguing that the Court invalidated relatively 
few laws and that it was a “progressive” force.  He also notes, however, that Warren circum-
scribed his study quite narrowly and consequently missed a large number of invalidations 
that other scholars subsequently identified. Id.; citing Charles Warren, The Progressiveness 
of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294 (1913).  Warren also wrote 
another piece with similar findings that Friedman does not cite.  Charles Warren, A Bulwark 
to the State Police Power—The United States Supreme Court, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 667 (1913).  
Those articles were, of course, part of Warren’s efforts to defend the Court against Progres-
sive attacks.  In spite of such studies tending to minimize the significance of the Court’s 
invalidations, those invalidations were nonetheless of great importance.  Many of the laws 
the Court upheld were of minor significance, while many of those it struck down were of far-
reaching social and political significance.  Further, the Court’s invalidations undoubtedly had 
the effect of voiding large numbers of similar statutes in other states as well as discouraging 
or preventing enactment of many other such laws in states across the nation.  Whatever the 
exact number of invalidations, moreover, it is clear that the Court voided hundreds of laws, 
especially those enacted by the states.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 472 n.138.  One promi-
nent scholar placed the number of invalidations between 1874 and 1937 at close to 600, with 
over 500 being state laws, ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 511 (5th ed. 1976) (citing BENJAMIN F. 
WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1942)), while a recent work 
states that in the bare ten years from 1920 to 1930 the Court invalidated 140 state laws, 
UROFSKY, supra note 70, at 599.  
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of another pair of interstate commerce cases that illustrate the same truth.  
Hall was decided in 1878, a year after Munn, while Louisville, New Orleans 
and Texas Pacific Railway Co. v. Mississippi106 came down in 1890, four 
years after Wabash.  In Hall, the Court invoked the Commerce Clause to 
invalidate a state law that prohibited racial discrimination against passen-
gers on common carriers.  There, the Court ignored the fact that the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court had held that the statute applied only to intrastate pas-
sengers and ruled—in the language Wabash quoted—that the statute “must 
necessarily influence [the carrier’s] conduct to some extent in the manage-
ment of his business throughout his entire [interstate] voyage.”107  Twelve 
years later in Louisville, the Court upheld a state statute that required racial 
segregation on railroads.108  There, it found no improper intrusion into inter-
state commerce and relied on the fact that the Mississippi Supreme Court 
had ruled that the statute applied only to intrastate trips.  In Hall and Louis-
ville, in other words, the Court found a constitutional distinction between 
two statutes that differed only in the contrasting racial policies they embo-
died.  It found the one prohibiting racial discrimination void; it found the 
one requiring racial discrimination valid.   
Considering the four cases together throws into even clearer relief the 
contextual and policy-driven nature of the Court’s decisions in all of them.  
In the two earlier cases—Munn and Hall—the Court construed the Com-
merce Clause differently, narrowly in the economic case and broadly in the 
race case; in the two later cases—Wabash and Louisville—it once again 
construed the provision differently, this time broadly in the economic case 
and narrowly in the race case.  In Wabash, the Court relied on Hall; in 
Louisville, it distinguished Hall.  In all, the breadth or narrowness of the 
Commerce Clause was not determined by factual records that established 
different impacts on interstate commerce or by the constructions that the 
state supreme courts had placed on the statutes at issue.  Much less were 
they determined by precedents, legal logic, general principles, or the lan-
guage of the Constitution.  They were determined, rather, by the justices’ 
views of desirable public policy.  In shifting doctrinally from Munn to Wa-
bash, the Court was moving to restrict state power to regulate interstate 
business interests; in shifting doctrinally from Hall to Louisville, it was 
moving to preserve racial discrimination and segregation. 
As those and a multitude of other cases ranging across the judicial 
spectrum suggest, the late nineteenth-century Supreme Court was a policy-
driven institution.109  Consequently, it is time to abandon the idea that it was 
  
 106. 133 U.S. 587 (1890). 
 107. Hall, 95 U.S. at 489. 
 108. Louisville, 133 U.S. at 591-92.  
 109. E.g., United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 486 (1887) (creating unprecedented 
new law to prevent counterfeiting of foreign bank notes in the U.S. and noting the nation’s 
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distinctively “formalistic” in its decision-making.110  As Friedman’s book 
makes clear, at no point has the Supreme Court been a “formalist” institu-
tion,111 and its work during the turn-of-the-century decades constituted no 
exception.  During those years the Court continued as a highly specialized 
and quite pragmatic institution that sought to shape the Constitution and 
laws to serve what shifting coalitions of majority justices—influenced by a 
variety of social, moral, personal, doctrinal, political, professional, and in-
tellectual forces—considered desirable national policies.  A true understand-
ing of the Court and its work must come from an understanding of that 
complex and dynamic historical reality, and in that scholarly effort the con-
cept of “formalism” has ceased to be helpful.  Indeed, it has become a sub-
stantial obstacle. 
Why the idea of “formalism” took root in the writing of American le-
gal and constitutional history is itself an interesting historical question.  In 
part, its widespread acceptance was due to the fact that American legal edu-
cation changed substantially in the late nineteenth century under the influ-
ence of Christopher Columbus Langdell and his “case method” of instruc-
tion, an approach that stressed the rigorous analysis of cases to identify the 
true legal principles that properly applied to specific legal questions.112  In 
part, too, it was due to the long line of influential writers, beginning with 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who criticized both Langdell’s jurisprudential 
assumptions and turn-of-the-century judicial decisions that invalidated gov-
  
substantial and growing foreign financial interests: “No nation can be more interested in this 
question than the United States”); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 226 (1882) (establish-
ing federal sovereign immunity on ground, inter alia, that “it is essential to the common 
defense and general welfare” of the nation); see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Some Horwitzian 
Themes in the Law and History of the Federal Courts, in 2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN 
LEGAL HISTORY: LAW, IDEOLOGY, AND METHODS—ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORTON J. 
HORWITZ 271-81 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy, eds., 2010). 
 110. Any legal system recognized as such by American scholars would have “forma-
listic” elements—rules, concepts, and some structure of accepted logic.  Further, a court may 
adopt a relatively abstract method of reasoning that eschews references to social facts and 
avoids the explicit discussion of policy considerations.  Such a method would be a matter of 
rhetorical style, and the late nineteenth century Court may have tended to employ that style 
more than earlier or later Courts.  See, e.g., PURCELL, supra note 90, at 253-54; KARL N. 
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960).  The idea of “for-
malism” generally used in the historical literature, however, involves something quite differ-
ent, the proposition that the Court essentially ignored social realities, consulted only clear 
and authoritative legal sources, and reasoned logically from those sources to reach necessary 
legal conclusions.  That is the concept of formalism that should be abandoned. 
 111. “[M]uch of what Marshall did in rendering the Marbury decision violated im-
portant norms of judging.”  FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 63. 
 112. There is a large literature on Langdell and his impact.  See, e.g., WILLIAM P. 
LAPIANA, LOGIC & EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 
(1994); BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: C.C. 
LANGDELL, 1826-1906 (2009). 
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ernment regulatory efforts.113  Progressives believed such decisions were 
based on exceptionally unrealistic assumptions about the nature of industrial 
society, and to undermine their authority they began characterizing them as 
“abstract,” “metaphysical,” “mechanical,” and “conceptualistic,” derisive 
labels that were gradually subsumed in the term “formalism.”114  More 
broadly, acceptance of the term “formalism” may also have been the result 
of the scholarship of those trained in intellectual history who brought their 
discipline’s methodology to the study of law.115  Seeking to integrate legal 
thinking into comprehensive analyses that identified the fundamental pre-
conceptions of an age,116 they seem to have believed that the theoretical as-
sumptions behind Langdell’s pedagogy must have been fundamentally simi-
lar to those underlying diverse types of legal writing, not only philosophical 
essays and doctrinal treatises but also practitioner’s handbooks and judicial 
opinions.  Thus, “formalism” became a term used to characterize the intel-
lectual assumptions of the turn-of-the-century decades, and many scholars 
consequently adopted it and assumed that it must apply equally to all areas 
  
 113. “I have referred to Langdell several times in dealing with contracts because to 
my mind he represents the powers of darkness.  He is all for logic and hates any reference to 
anything outside of it . . . .”  Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock 
(Apr. 10, 1881), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE 
HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932 17 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1961).  For 
Holmes’s reference to Langdell as a “legal theologian,” see Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 
233, 1234 (1880).  For Holmes’s attack on judicial decisions invalidating government regula-
tions, see, for example, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing).  See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE 
INNER SELF 148-353 (1993). 
 114. Friedman notes that “Progressive lawyers and judges scoffed at this sort of legal 
formalism,” FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 192, but he does not explore the extent to which 
such critics purposely adopted and used the label of “formalism” and its cognates as polemi-
cal tools to discredit their political adversaries. 
 115. As one trained as an intellectual historian, I long ago acknowledged my own 
earlier complicity in using the term, PURCELL, supra note 90, at 394-95 n.13, and urged a 
thorough reconsideration of the concept, id. at 253-54, 395-96 nn.14-15.  Other scholars have 
also questioned the concept in varying ways.  E.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Instrumentalism and 
Property Rights: A Reconsideration of American “Styles of Judicial Reasoning” in the 19th 
Century, 1975 WISC. L. REV. 1 (1975); Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray and the Mor-
al Basis of Classical Legal Thought, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1513 (2001). 
 116. For classic statements of this approach to intellectual history, see, for example, 
Franklin L. Baumer, Intellectual History and Its Problems, 21 J. MODERN HIST. 191 (1949); 
John C. Greene, Objectives and Methods in Intellectual History, 44 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 
58 (1957).  For examples of the approach, see,  HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN 
MIND: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CHARACTER SINCE THE 1880S 
(1950); STOW PERSONS, AMERICAN MINDS: A HISTORY OF IDEAS (1958).  Perhaps most in-
fluential in bringing the term “formalism”—and an intellectual history approach—into the 
writing of American legal history was Morton G. White’s book, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN 
AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1949).   
Fall] Barry Friedman’s The Will of the People 687 
of legal thought, including the work of the courts generally and the Supreme 
Court in particular. 
Whatever the reasons for its persistence, however, the concept of 
“formalism” should now be retired.  The turn-of-the-century Court was a 
highly instrumentalist and value-driven institution.  It may have been—and, 
indeed, was—a distinctive Court, but its distinctiveness did not lay in any 
commitment to, or practice of, “formalism” as a method of decision mak-
ing.117 
C.  Race, Corporations, and the Turn-of-the-Century Turns 
Friedman’s treatment of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries is particularly important, for his emphasis on the Court’s growing sensi-
tivity to popular opinion suggests that the justices recognized the close rela-
tion that existed between their economic regulatory decisions and their deci-
sions involving racial issues.  Although doctrinally unrelated and presenting 
formally different constitutional questions, those two lines of decisions were 
in fact mutually supporting and defined the dominant practical achieve-
ments of the turn-of-the-century Court.  Indeed, they undermine even fur-
ther the idea that the Court was “formalist” in its decision-making. 
In the aftermath of the Civil War and early Reconstruction, Friedman 
explains, the Court “now understood the value of having a constituency,” 
and it acted accordingly.118  Abandoning the goals of Radical Reconstruction 
and “bowing to public sentiments” on the race issue was “easy enough” and, 
in any event, may have accorded with the justices’ private wishes.119  “The 
decisions in favor of business and property rights, on the other hand, were 
the product of a deliberate effort by the country’s rulers to pander to the 
captains of industry.”120  The Court understood that it needed the backing of 
“those with the political power to protect it.”121  Those two paramount lines 
of decisions, then, reflected the Court’s bow to powerful external forces, 
general public opinion on racial matters and a political and corporate elite 
on economic regulatory matters.  Thus, Friedman argues, the Court’s beha-
vior in both areas was far more calculated and policy-based than many 
scholars have recognized or acknowledged. 
  
 117. The Court’s “style” of reasoning may, of course, have been relatively formalis-
tic.    See supra, note 110.  For discussions of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
American legal thought, see STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM 
PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE (2000); NEIL DUXBURY, 
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF 
CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937 (1998). 
 118. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 138. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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Equally important, Friedman implies—if he does not quite assert—
that the Court’s race decisions were necessary to ensure the success of its 
economic regulatory decisions.  The latter decisions, after all, were highly 
controversial, and they largely established the agenda of national political 
and constitutional debate that dominated the next half century.  Contempo-
rary Progressive critics leveled grave accusations against the Court’s rea-
soning, competence, and alleged social biases, while muckraking journal-
ists, labor leaders, social workers, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and prominent polit-
ical figures rallied the voting public against the Court’s anti-regulatory deci-
sions.122  As public opinion grew highly critical if not flatly hostile to the 
Court, both the Republican and Democratic Parties—as well as the Populist 
Party and two successive Progressive Parties—echoed the criticisms and 
proposed reforms that ranged from mild alterations to drastic reductions in 
the power of the federal judiciary.123  In spite of those vigorous and ex-
tended efforts, however, the Court remained untouched—indeed, its juris-
diction was expanded in 1914—and the lower courts were subjected to 
nothing more than a handful of limited and relatively minor restrictions.124 
The Court remained secure from those extended assaults not only be-
cause it enjoyed the powerful backing of the nation’s propertied classes and 
because its critics were divided and uncertain.125  It was also secure because 
it had given white Americans what they had most wanted on the race ques-
tion, and it had thereby eliminated that galvanizing and explosive issue as a 
potentially destructive threat to its position and power.  The Court’s ac-
quiescence in the post-Reconstruction racial settlement, in fact, was likely 
essential to guarantee its position and generate the public support that was 
necessary to underwrite its bold and highly controversial assertions of judi-
cial authority in economic regulatory matters.126  No less pious a devotee 
than Charles Warren himself—the Court’s indefatigable defender—
acknowledged that truth.  Admitting that the “practical effect” of the 
  
 122. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND 
LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937 (1994). 
 123. See, e.g., id. at 70-85, 110-54, 193-232, 285-312. 
 124. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 184-86. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Indeed, it seems likely that the Court’s acceptance of the post-
Reconstruction settlement was an essential prerequisite for that subsequent re-
shaping of federal law.  Had the Justices sought to deny the constitutional terms 
on which the North and South reunited after Reconstruction, their actions would 
have provoked bitter and widespread opposition that would have severely under-
mined the Court’s political support and institutional authority.  That, in turn, 
might well have dissuaded or prevented it from adopting the increasingly ex-
panded supervisory role it began playing in other areas of American politics and 
government in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on 
Law, Race, History, and “Federal Courts”, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927, 2033 (2003). 
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Court’s race decisions “was to leave the Federal statutes almost wholly inef-
fective to protect the negro,”127  Warren accepted that result with complete 
satisfaction: 
[T]here can be no question that the decisions in these [race] cases were most fortu-
nate.  They largely eliminated from National politics the negro question which had 
so long embittered Congressional debates; they relegated the burden and the duty 
of protecting the negro to the States, to whom they properly belonged; and they 
served to restore confidence in the National Court in the Southern States.128   
The decisions were “fortunate,” in other words, precisely because they se-
cured and strengthened the Court’s position and authority across the board.   
While Friedman would surely reject the claim that the Court’s race 
decisions were “fortunate,” he does seem to agree that those decisions 
strengthened the Court politically, and he at least implies that they helped 
ensure the public support necessary to sustain the Court against those who 
attacked its economic regulatory decisions.  In fact, he seems to state that 
view at one point with surprising bluntness.  “By abandoning blacks and 
embracing corporations, the Court rose to the pinnacle of power.”129   
Friedman, however, remains vague on one issue, the extent to which 
the justices themselves shared the racist attitudes common to most white 
Americans.  He readily acknowledges that Reconstruction “crumbled” in 
part because “[r]acism clearly showed its ugly face in the North and South 
alike,”130 and that “some of the justices, for a variety of reasons, would have 
been happy to abandon Reconstruction.”131 At one point he even suggests 
that the Court’s decisions “bowing” to popular racial attitudes “may well 
have accorded with the proclivities of a majority of the justices.”132  Still, he 
avoids directly attributing racist views to the justices or suggesting that their 
decisions were actually guided in some part by racist attitudes.  Thus, he 
readily accepts the claim that the justices bowed to racist pressures,133 but he 
  
 127. 3 WARREN, supra note 3, at 326. 
 128. Id. at 330.  Indicative of his attitude, Warren acknowledged that the Court was 
abandoning blacks to the control of the states, id. at 326-30, but was nonetheless still able to 
praise it as the trustworthy guarantor of constitutional rights.  See id. at 330.  He declared 
proudly that “the Court showed itself as determined to defend the rights of an individual, 
when trespassed upon by an officer of the National Government, as when injured by the 
action of a State officer,”  id. at 393.  He apparently reconciled those statements by embrac-
ing the view of the “eminent Southern lawyer,” whom he quoted: “‘What gave satisfaction to 
the South and strength to bear the affliction in which they found themselves was the determi-
nation of the Court to maintain the true character of the Government.’”  Id. at 330. 
 129. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, 138. 
 130. Id. at 148. 
 131. Id. at 457 n.97. 
 132. Id. at 138. 
 133. See id.  For the view that the Waite Court did not “bow” to racism, see Michael 
Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 SUP. CT. 
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side-steps the question whether some or all of them actively shared those 
racist attitudes and shaped their decisions accordingly.134 
Friedman’s reluctance to address the question of judicial racism is un-
derstandable.135  It undoubtedly reflects the awkwardness and difficulty of 
the issue, and it may also reflect the intense desire of legal scholars to pre-
serve an idealized image of the Court and its justices.  It is deeply comfort-
ing, after all, to believe that the United States Supreme Court operates with 
sufficient institutional purity and rectitude that certain kinds of failings are 
virtually impossible.  Thus, the justices could not have shaped the law to 
accord with their own racist attitudes, some legal scholars seem to believe, 
because Supreme Court justices could not conceivably have done that sort 
of thing.136 
But why not?  Racism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries was not hidden, illegal, dishonorable, scandalous, unpopular, or gener-
ally considered immoral.  Rather, it was openly announced, widely shared, 
frequently voiced, scientifically justified, morally acceptable, and often reli-
giously sanctioned.137  Indeed, racist attitudes were frequently advanced 
  
REV. 39, 41.  Benedict qualifies his view by acknowledging that after 1888 the subsequent 
Fuller Court did reflect racist attitudes.  See id. at 40, 78. 
 134. For the claim that the courts were not themselves racist, see WILLIAM E. 
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 
186 (1988).  I should note that in a footnote Friedman suggests that in a prior work I pressed 
too hard in arguing that the Court’s late nineteenth-century decisions were influenced by the 
racism of the justices.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 457 n.97. 
 135. Scholars might well shy away from the issue for several reasons.  First, it may 
seem indelicate to make such accusations against honored members of the nation’s highest 
bench or unfair to impugn them on the basis of the very different moral and cultural stan-
dards that subsequent generations embraced.  Second, the issue presents evidentiary prob-
lems.  While there is overtly racist language in some Court opinions and substantial evidence 
showing that various individual justices held racist views, those facts arguably do not prove 
that racist attitudes “caused” the Court’s decisions.  Those who wish to defend the Court 
from such claims can usually, if not invariably, find some theory to explain those decisions 
on doctrinal grounds.  Third, and perhaps most important, showing that some of the Court’s 
decisions were inspired by such improper—and now dishonored—attitudes could raise a host 
of embarrassing questions about the continued legal authority of some basic constitutional 
and statutory decisions that are now woven into the fabric of American law.  E.g., Purcell, 
supra note 126, at 2056-59. 
 136. The denial of racist motivations on the Court reminds of the attitude of some 
white historians toward the long-standing and, until recently, long-dismissed claim that 
Thomas Jefferson carried on a long-term sexual relationship with his slave, Sally Hemings.  
Such a relationship, they seemed to believe, was flatly impossible for the simple reason that 
Jefferson was simply not the kind of man who could have done that sort of thing.  See 
ANNETTE GORDON-REED, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND SALLY HEMINGS: AN AMERICAN 
CONTROVERSY (1997). 
 137. The literature on late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century racism is immense.  
See e.g., THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 253-86 (1964); 
STOW PERSONS, AMERICAN MINDS: A HISTORY OF IDEAS 276-97 (1958); LEON F. LITWACK, 
TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW (1998); MATTHEW FRYE 
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publicly on the precise ground that recognition of racial differences was 
necessary for the protection and well-being of the “inferior” and “uncivi-
lized” races themselves, and those who advanced such ideas often claimed 
to be acting from the highest and noblest of motives.138  Such attitudes, 
moreover, not only animated domestic politics but also helped shape the 
nation’s foreign policy and territorial expansions after the Civil War.139  If 
late nineteenth-century judges were white males of their time, as all of them 
surely were, how could at least most of them not have shared those perva-
sive racial attitudes and assumptions?140  And if judicial decisions are 
  
JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY 
OF RACE (1998); Kornel Chang, Circulating Race and Empire: Transnational Labor Activism 
and the Politics of Anti-Asian Agitation in the Anglo-American Pacific World, 1880-1910, 96 
J. AM. HIST. 678 (2009).  Anyone doubting the extent to which racism suffused the American 
mind need only consider popular movies that were made from the turn of the century into the 
1940s.  See, e.g., THOMAS CRIPPS, SLOW FADE TO BLACK: THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN FILM, 
1900-1942 (1977); SUSAN COURTNEY, HOLLYWOOD FANTASIES AND MISCEGENATION: 
SPECTACULAR NARRATIVES OF GENDER AND RACE, 1903-1967 (2005); CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, 
FORGERIES OF MEMORY AND MEANING: BLACKS AND THE REGIMES OF RACE IN AMERICAN 
THEATER AND FILM BEFORE WORLD WAR II (2007).  Indeed, as one scholar has written, “even 
as American propaganda castigated Axis racism [during World War II], the traditional ste-
reotypes of the movie black failed to disappear.”  DANIEL J. LEAB, FROM SAMBO TO 
SUPERSPADE: THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN MOTION PICTURES 119 (1975).  Perhaps even more 
indicative of the nation’s pervasive popular racism was the place and image of public racial 
lynchings in American culture.  See, e.g., AMY LOUISE WOOD, LYNCHING AND SPECTACLE: 
WITNESSING RACIAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, 1890-1940 (2009). 
 138. In the end, [Woodrow] Wilson, like Theodore Roosevelt, shared the An-
glo-Saxons’ assumption that they had the right, even responsibility, to rule and 
raise up the lesser peoples of the non-European world.  Latin Americans, Asians, 
Slavs, and Africans were, as Roosevelt phrased it, in “the childhood stage of race 
development.”  Wilson used almost the same language, saying they were “in the 
childhood of their political growth.”  The idea of the civilizing mission and the 
language of uplift had progressive connotations at the time . . . . 
THOMAS BENDER, A NATION AMONG NATIONS: AMERICA’S PLACE IN WORLD HISTORY 236-37 
(2006). 
 139. During the war to control the Philippines, American soldiers used racial epithets 
regularly to describe the native population.  “‘The country won’t be pacified,” one told a 
reporter, “until the niggers are killed off like the Indians.’”  WARREN ZIMMERMANN, FIRST 
GREAT TRIUMPH: HOW FIVE AMERICANS MADE THEIR COUNTRY A WORLD POWER 406 
(2002); see PAUL A. KRAMER, THE BLOOD OF GOVERNMENT: RACE, EMPIRE, THE UNITED 
STATES, AND THE PHILIPPINES (2006); AMY KAPLAN, THE ANARCHY OF EMPIRE IN THE 
MAKING OF U.S. CULTURE (2002).  It is important to note that racist attitudes also strongly 
supported sharp limits on American territorial expansion.  See generally ERIC T. L. LOVE, 
RACE OVER EMPIRE:  RACISM AND U.S. IMPERIALISM, 1865-1900 (2004). 
 140. “Racism” obviously comes in a variety of forms, exists in varying degrees, and 
prompts varying types of policy goals.  E.g., LOVE, supra note 139 (arguing that white rac-
ism was a stronger force for limiting American overseas territorial expansion than for en-
couraging it).  Thus, there could have been—and surely were—different types and degrees of 
“racism” represented on the late nineteenth-century Court.  See, e.g., Purcell, supra note 126, 
at 2014-28. 
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shaped by the personal views and values of judges141—as almost everyone, 
however grudgingly, seems to acknowledge142—how could those racial 
views not in some part have animated the Court’s decisions?143  
The reason commonly advanced for denying the direct influence of 
racism—beyond, of course, the charge that the justices simply surrendered 
to public prejudices they did not share—is that the Court’s decisions fol-
lowed traditional principles and established canons of construction.  As a 
matter of history, however, that explanation is grievously inadequate.  First, 
those “traditional” principles and established canons had meanings that 
were in most cases so rubbery and manipulable that the Court could have 
fairly interpreted them in a variety of different ways.144  The justices’ inter-
pretative discretion was broad, and their specific rulings on race were not, in 
fact, compelled by any authoritative legal source.  Second, as a matter of 
historical explanation, the fact that the Court constructed doctrinal argu-
ments supporting its conclusions is not by itself persuasive.  Creating and 
offering doctrinal justifications is the Court’s standard method of operation, 
and the justices could and would have constructed such justifications for 
whatever decisions they made.  Thus, their justifications tell us little or 
nothing necessarily about the driving substantive purposes and motives that 
led them to their decisions.  Doctrinal justification is simply not historical 
explanation.145  Third, The Slaughter-House Cases and other contemporane-
  
 141. Needless to say, of course, they are also shaped by combinations of many other 
social, cultural, political, professional, and institutional factors, including formal “legal” 
sources. 
 142. As then-Judge Antonin Scalia acknowledged shortly before he was nominated 
for a place on the Supreme Court, his intellectual life was “not separate” from his religious 
life, and his legal views were “‘inevitably affected by moral and theological perceptions.’”  
Corey Robin, Get Over It!, LONDON REV. BOOKS, June 10, 2010, at 29, 31 (reviewing JOAN 
BISKUPIC, THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA (2009) 
(quoting Justice Antonin Scalia).   
 143. One might make a plausible, if still qualified, defense of the Court by noting that 
it did on some occasions attempt to counter or moderate racist policies and that, consequent-
ly, it was at least “less racist” than most other governmental institutions and white-controlled 
business enterprises and private associations.  See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 
(1886); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 
332 (1924). 
 144. On ambiguities in the “principles” of federalism and separation of powers, see, 
for example, EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 17-37 (2007).  On the meaning of the 
Reconstruction statutes and amendments, see, for example, MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO 
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); 
Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986). 
 145. This is not to deny the shaping and channeling influence, or the sometimes deci-
sive significance, of doctrine in the Court’s decisions.  It is only to say that the actual impact 
of doctrine on any particular decision is a contingent historical fact that can be evaluated 
only in specific situations and contexts.  Needless to say, the role doctrine plays in the 
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ous decisions146 stressed the fact that the unquestioned purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment was to protect African-Americans, and it was that expli-
cit purpose that the Court refused to enforce and then, in effect, bluntly re-
jected.147  The justices understood full well what the Reconstruction 
amendments and statutes were designed to accomplish. They simply refused 
for the most part to effectively honor that purpose.   
Finally, once Reconstruction had ended and its legal achievements had 
been rendered useless to African-Americans, the Court began a vigorous 
expansion of national legislative and judicial power.  It restricted the powers 
of the states sharply and in a variety of ways; it broadened across the board 
the reach of federal statutory, judge-made, and constitutional law; and it 
expanded the jurisdiction and authority of the federal courts to enforce both 
those new limitations on the states and those new mandates of federal law.148  
Thus, the Court’s commitment to the “traditional” constitutional principles 
that had supposedly compelled its earlier racial decisions suddenly withered 
and lost their commanding power when the Court was asked to protect na-
tional corporations rather than African-Americans.  In the two areas the 
Court simply adopted different substantive policies, disclaiming the proprie-
ty of acting in one area while asserting it vigorously in the other.    
Thus, it seems clear that it was social motives, not legal principles and 
doctrines, that shaped the Court’s decisions in the late nineteenth century.  
Further, as a matter of historical understanding, it seems impossible to be-
lieve that shared racist assumptions among some or all of the justices were 
not integral components of those social motives.  As Friedman notes, “jus-
tices are only human.”149  
D.  History and Theory 
Consideration of those three historical issues confirms Friedman’s ba-
sic thesis, even if it also suggests some of the complexities involved in at-
tempting to specify the precise influence that public opinion exerted on the 
Court at any given time.  The first issue, the significance of “federal ques-
  
Court’s work differs from the generally more important role it plays in the work of lower 
courts.  See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS (2007); 
Donald R. Songer, Martha Humphries Ginn, & Tammy A. Sarver, Do Judges Follow the 
Law When There is No Fear of Reversal?, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 137 (2003). 
 146. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 51 (1873); Ex parte Virginia, 100 
U.S. 339, 344-45 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879). 
 147. The Court began hinting at a different and broader application of the amendment 
in, for example, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886), and 
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), and it began using the amendment to protect corpo-
rations from state economic regulation in 1890.  Chicago v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890). 
 148. See Purcell, supra note 97, at 942-60. 
 149. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 374. 
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tion” jurisdiction, highlights the fact that social and political changes drive 
the Court to reshape the law to meet new political demands that arise out of 
changing social conditions.  The second issue, the Court’s instrumentalism, 
downplays the role of formal doctrine and highlights the centrality of subs-
tantive policy choices in determining its decisions and shaping its doctrines.   
The third, the impact of racist attitudes and economic interests, illustrates 
the force of both popular and elite opinion in guiding those judicial policy 
choices.  Each issue illustrates the fact that the Court is rooted in a complex 
and changing social context, and each suggests that public opinion has been 
and remains a pervasive—if vague, varied, and volatile—force in shaping 
its decisions and channeling the course of American constitutional law.   
CONCLUSION 
Given the argument and conclusions of The Will of the People, Profes-
sor Friedman may well find himself subject to criticism from those who 
advance some form of ideological originalism150 or insist that the Constitu-
tion’s meaning is clear and unchanging.151  He may, too, be called a “relativ-
  
 150. By “ideological” originalism, I mean those forms of originalism that purport to 
find relatively clear and specifically directive answers for contemporary constitutional ques-
tions, utilize highly selective or artificially narrow methodologies, ignore the complexities 
and uncertainties of human behavior and the inadequacies of the historical record, and draw 
conclusions that are for the most part at least compatible with their authors’ substantive 
policy views.  The strength of such originalism lies in its claim of simplicity and authenticity 
and its pose of objectivity and deference, qualities that make it highly useful in arenas of 
sound-byte politics.  An “originalist defense” is “easily digested by the public.”  David J. 
Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the 
Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 801 (2008).  See 
generally, Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009). 
 151. The late eighteenth century, the age of the Founding, Bernard Bailyn wrote, is a 
“lost, remote world.”  BERNARD BAILYN, TO BEGIN THE WORLD ANEW: THE GENIUS AND 
AMBIGUITIES OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS 6 (2003).  Most—perhaps almost all—scholars 
and judges (myself and, I am confident, Professor Friedman included) are “originalists” in 
the sense that they accept the idea that the Constitution’s text is the essential starting point 
for analysis and that the writings of the framers and ratifiers are valuable sources that can aid 
in understanding, interpreting, and applying the Constitution.  Most, however, also believe 
that those sources are usually of limited utility—especially in dealing with modern problems 
and most disputed issues involving the systemic relations between the levels and branches of 
American government—and that other considerations (such as judicial precedents, historical 
practices, structural considerations, changing social conditions, the needs of practical effica-
cy, and prevailing moral and ethical ideals) may be equally or more important in any particu-
lar interpretative task.  See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS (1921); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).  The relative de 
facto significance and utility of textual and “originalist” sources is a matter that can only be 
determined on an issue-by-issue basis and only by careful, comprehensive, and broadly-
informed historical study that recognizes both the complexity and difference of earlier pe-
riods from the present as well as the impact and significance of changes that have reshaped 
the nation and its government over time. 
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ist,” a “nihilist,” or perhaps even a constitutional apostate, one who rejects 
the very concept of limited government under a written constitution.152   
None of those charges would be true, of course, for Friedman is a 
committed moralist, a committed democrat, a committed legalist, and a 
committed constitutionalist.  His project is simply—I should, of course, say 
“complexly”—to understand exactly how American constitutionalism func-
tions, to explore its underlying dynamics, and to identify and probe its fun-
damental strengths and weaknesses.  The Will of the People advances that 
most challenging project by illuminating the nature and operation of judicial 
review in American government, clarifying the complex and changing rela-
tionship between the Court and popular opinion, and advancing a provoca-
tive hypothesis about the working compromise on judicial review that 
Americans have seemingly hammered out over the course of more than two 
hundred years of self-government.   
Perhaps most important, The Will of the People throws into sharp re-
lief one overriding fact: No form of judicial idolatry, ideological original-
ism, or constitutional fundamentalism can capture the true values and dy-
namics of American constitutionalism.  For well or ill, the future of both our 
nation and our Constitution lies not with pretend certainties or filio-pietistic 
myths but with the commitment and determination of “ourselves and our 
Posterity” to maintain a free, just, tolerant, well-ordered, and self-governing 
society.153  And, if Americans today do not properly nourish, protect, and 
educate that Posterity—and bequeath to it a safe, secure, and hopeful fu-
ture—we will not have fulfilled the trust imposed on us to preserve and pass 
on our invaluable but fragile experiment in constitutional self-government.  
The Will of the People teaches a fundamental lesson, that the future of our 
constitutional system as well as our national life lies “not in our stars but in 
ourselves.”154  It is a sobering, perhaps unnerving, lesson, but we should be 
deeply grateful to Professor Friedman for teaching it so effectively.      
 
  
 152. See, e.g., Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial 
Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1586-90 (2004) (criticizing views similar to Friedman’s put 
forth in Robert Post, Foreward: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts and 
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003).  “Post’s jurisprudence of constitutional culture is a juri-
sprudence of extreme constitutional relativism. . . . [W]e think [Post’s view] represents the 
repudiation of law as a concept distinct from politics.”  Id. at 1590. 
 153. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 154. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR, act 1 sc. 2, ll. 147-48 
(Folger Shakespeare Library 1992). 
